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Treatment of Cash Distributions to Shareholders Pursuant to a Corporate Reor-
ganization: Shimberg v. United States '—Taxpayer, Mandel Shimberg, jr.,
was president and majority shareholder' of La Monte-Shimberg Corporation
[LSC]. 3 In September 1970, LSC executed a Plan and Agreement of Merger
[Agreement] with MGIC Investment Corporation [MGIC]. 4 Under the terms
of the Agreement, LSC was to be acquired by MGIC in a statutory merger
which qualified as a reorganization under Internal Revenue Code section
368(a)(1)(A).' In December 1970, the merger was consummated, with LSC
shareholders receiving a pro rata distribution of $625,000 cash, 32,132 shares
of MGIC common stock outright, and the same number of shares in escrow.'
The taxpayer's share of this distribution amounted to 24,461 shares of MGIC
common stock, a like number of shares in escrow, and a cash "boot"' of
$417,449. Prior to the reorganization, LSC had undistributed earnings and
profits of approximately $725,000.8
On his 1970 federal income tax return, Mr. Shimberg reported the cash'
received in connection with the merger as a long term capital gain from the
sale of a capital asset.'' The Commissioner of Internal Revenue determined
that the cash distribution constituted a dividend under section 356(a)(2),"
' 577 F.2d 283 (5th Cir. 1978), ceri. denied,	 U.S.	 99 S. Ct. 1019
(1979).
Prior to the reorganization, Mr. Shimberg owned (directly or indirectly)
66.8% of LSC capital stock. Id. at 284.
3 LSC was a closely held Florida corporation engaged in home construction
and sales. Id.
Id. at 285. MGIC is a publicly held Delaware corporation. Id.
5 I.R.C. § 368(a)(1)(A). The parties stipulated that the merger was an "A"
reorganization and that if the cash did not have "the effect of a distribution of a
dividend" within the meaning of § 356(a)(2), the LSC shareholders would be entitled
to capital gains treatment. Brief for Plaintiff at 5, Shimberg v. United States, 577 F.2d
283 (5th Cir. 1978). The word "reorganization" has a technical meaning for Federal
income tax purposes. Section 1.368-2(a) of the Treasury regulations restricts the use of
the term to those transactions which fall within one of the six categories found in
§ 368. The letter of the subheading is used as a prefix to identify the form of the
corporate adjustment.
ti 577 F.2d at 285. The shares in escrow were to be delivered in five years
upon the satisfaction of an earnings requirement based upon an average of the earn-
ings of LSC for the years 1970 through 1974, Brief for Plaintiff at 5, Shimberg v.
United States, 577 F.2d 283 (5th Cir. 1978).
7 Property received in addition to stock is commonly known as "hoot."
A 577 F.2d at 288.
u Id.
'" I.R.C. § 356(a) provides:
SEC. 356. RECEIPT OF ADDITIONAL CONSIDERATION.
(a) Gain on Exchanges—
(1) Recognition of gain. If
(A) section 354 or 355 would apply to an exchange but for
the fact that
(B) the property received in the exchange consists not only of
property permitted by section 354 or 355 to be received without
the recognition of gain but also of other property or money, then
the gain, if any, to the recipient shall be recognized, but in an
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taxable as ordinary income." The taxpayer paid the resulting deficiency and
subsequently filed for a refund." Upon the Commissioner's disallowance of
his refund claim, Mr. Shimherg commenced suit in federal district court.'"
The United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida held
that the cash received by the taxpayer in connection with the merger did not
have "the effect of the distribution of a dividend" within the meaning of sec-
tion 356(a)(2), and therefore was taxable as a capital gain.14 The court stated
that whether the boot distribution would be entitled to dividend or capital
gains treatment, depended upon an examination of the total transaction and
its effect on the taxpayer's interest as a shareholder." In reaching its deci-
sion, the court compared the taxpayer's pre-merger interest of 68 percent in
LSC with his post-merger interest of less than 1 percent in MGIC.'" Since
the transaction resulted in a meaningful reduction in the taxpayer's interest as
a shareholder, the district court held that the distribution of boot did not have
the effect of a dividend, but rather was taxable as a capital gain.' 7
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed the
decision of the district court and HELD: A pro rata distribution of cash to a
shareholder made pursuant to a merger of a closely held corporation with a
large publicly held corporation will be restructured as a dividend distribution
made by the acquired corporation prior to reorganization.' 8 In so holding,
the court rejected the district court's use of "meaningful reduction" analysis in
determining whether the distribution of boot has the effect of a dividend
under section 356(a)(2)." The Shiniberg court noted that a contrary holding
amount not in excess of the suns of such money and the fair mar-
ket value of such other property.
(2) Treatment as dividend. If an exchange is described in paragraph
(1) but has the effect of the distribution of a dividend, then there
shall be treated as a dividend to each distributee such an amount.
of the gain recognized under paragraph (1) as is not in excess of
his ratable share of the undistributed earnings and profits of the
corporation accumulated after February 28, 1913. The remainder,
if any, of the gain recognized under paragraph (l) shall be treated
as gain from the exchange of property.
" The term "dividend" can be defined generally as any distribution of prop-
erty made by a corporation out of earnings and profits - which effects no change in
basic relationships between the shareholder and either the corporation or the other
shareholders.
577 F.2d at 285. The IRS assessed the taxpayer $125,883 plus interest of
$16,169.93. Id.
Shinsherg v. United States. 415 F. Stapp. 832 (M.1). Fla. 1976). The taxpayer
commenced suit in the United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida
under 28 U.S.C, 1346(a)(I) (1976). Brief' for Plaintiff at 5, Shimberg v. United States,
577 F.2d 283 (5th Cir. 1978).
14
 415 F. Stipp. at 832.
Id. at 836.
'" Id. After the merger the plaintiff controlled less than 1 percent of the
NIG1C common stock. hl.
17 Id. at 837.
577 F.2d at 289-90.





would render section 356(a)(2) virtually meaningless since a small corpora-
tion's shareholders would always experience a marked reduction in control
where a larger corporation merges with a smaller one, unless the same
shareholders control both corporations. 29 Thus, the court emphasized that
the appropriate focus was not on the reduction in the shareholders' control of
the corporation which occurred as a result of the merger. 21 Instead, the
Fifth Circuit concluded that section 356(a)(2) requires a focus on whether the
distribution would have been taxed as a dividend if made prior to the
merger.' 2 Accordingly, the court restructured the transaction as if LSC had
made a hypothetical distribution of cash prior to the merger. 2 " Since LSC
had retained earnings of $725,000 prior to the merger, the court held that
the receipt of $625,000 boot by the former LSC shareholders was a dividend
taxable as ordinary income under section 356(a)(2). 24
The Shirnberg court's holding—that the determination of dividend effect
under section 356(a)(2) requires an examination of the boot distribution as if
it had been made by the acquired corporation prior to the reorganization—is
significant for two reasons. First, the Fifth Circuit's rejection of the meaning-
ful reduction test strongly indicates that a pro rata distribution of boot re-
ceived in connection with a merger will always have the effect of a distribution
of a dividend when the acquired corporation has sufficient earnings and prof-
its. Second, while Shimberg embraces basically the position of the Service as
enunciated in Revenue Ruling 75-83, 25 the decision is inconsistent with the
approach adopted by the Eighth Circuit in Wright v. United States." As a
result, the decision adds additional confusion to an already uncertain area in
the tax law.
This casenote will first review prior cases involving distributions of boot
to corporate shareholders, focusing in particular on the Eighth Circuit's deci-
sion in Wright." In this light., the casenote will then analyze and evaluate the
Shirnherg decision. Particular attention will be given to the applicability of sec-
tion 302 28 redemption principles in determining whether a boot distribution
2U Id.
21 Id. at 290.
22 Id. at 288.
23 Id. at 290.
24 Id. at 289-90.
1975-1 C.B. 112.
" 482 F.2c1 600 (8th Cir. 1973).
27 Id.
28 I.R.C.
	 302 provides in relevant part:
SEC. 302. DISTRIBUTIONS IN REDEMPTION OF STOCK.
(a) General Rule—If a corporation redeems its stock (within the mean-
ing of section 317(6)), and if paragraph (1), (2), (3), or (4) of subsection (b)
applies, such redemption shall he treated as a distribution in part or full
payment in exchange for the stock.
(b) Redemptions Treated to Exchanges—
(1) Redemptions not equivalent to dividends—Subsection (a) shall
apply if the redemption is not essentially equivalent to a div-
idend.
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has the effect of a distribution of a dividend under section 356(a)(2). It will be
submitted that the Shimberg court has failed to justify its holding that the use
of meaningful reduction analysis is inappropriate and that dividend effect
under section 356(a)(2) should be measured by reference to the acquired cor-
poration. 29 It will also be suggested that Congress amend section 356(a)(2)
and clarify how section 302 standards should be applied in the context of a
corporate reorganization.
I. LEGAL BACKGROUND
This section will initially examine the statutory framework of the section
368(a)(1)(A)" reorganization utilized in Shimberg, and will then trace the de-
velopment of the so-called "automatic dividend" rule. Specifically, the section
will examine the shift away from the automatic approach to the taxation of
boot distributions to the approach adopted by the Eighth Circuit in Wright v.
United States, whereby section 302 principles are used to determine dividend
effect under section 356. Finally, the section will examine Revenue Ruling
75-83, announcing the Service's refusal to follow the Wright decision.
Under section 368(a)(1)(A), if a merger or consolidation is effected in
compliance with state corporate law," as was the merger in Shimberg, no gain
or loss will be recognized if a corporation exchanges property for stock and
(2) Substantially disproportionate redemption of stock —
(A) In general —Subsection (a) shall apply if the distribu-
tion is substantially disproportionate with respect to the
shareholder.
(B) Limitation — This paragraph shall not apply unless
immediately after the redemption the shareholder owns less
than 50 percent of the total combined voting power of all
classes of stock entitled to vote.
(C) Definitions —For purposes of this paragraph, the dis-
tribution is substantially disproportionate if-
(i) the ratio which the voting stock of the corporation
owned by the shareholder immediately after the redemp-
tion bears to all of the voting stock of the corporation at
such time, is less than 80 percent of—
(ii) the ratio which the voting stock of the corporation
owned by the shareholder immediately before the redemp-
tion bears to all of the voting stock of the corporation
at such time. For purposes of this paragraph, no distribu-
tion shall be treated as substantially disproportionate unless
the shareholders ownership of the common stock of
the corporation (whether voting or nonvoting) after and
before redemption also meets the 80 percent requirement
of the preceding sentence. For purposes of the preceding
sentence, if there is more than one class of common stock,
the determination shall be made by reference to fair mar-
ket value.
29 577 F.2d at 289 n.15.
I.R.C.	 368(a)(I)(A).
" See DEL. CODE ANN., tit. 8, § 252 (Supp. 1977); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 607.234
(West 1977).
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securities in another corporation which is a party to the reorganization. 32 Such
mergers or consolidations are commonly referred to as "A" reorganizations.
Generally, state statutes allow shareholders to receive property other than
stock or securities as consideration for the reorganization." Section 356 pro-
vides that where other property (boot) is received in such an exchange, the
gain is to be recognized in an amount not in excess of the value of the prop-
erty received. 34 The issue then becomes whether the receipt of boot is tax-
able as a dividend or as a long-term capital gain. If the exchange has the
effect of the distribution of a dividend," section 356(a)(2) provides that the
gain will be treated as a dividend. 35 If the boot, does not have dividend ef-
fect, it will be treated as a capital gain.""
Until recently the government has adhered to an automatic dividend rule
under which all boot is taxed as a dividend to the extent of the taxpayer's pro
rata share of earnings and profits." This interpretation was based in large
part. on imprecise language in the Supreme Court's decision in Commissioner v.
Estate of Bedford." Bedford involved a cash distribution to shareholders made
in connection with a recapitalization." The Court stated in dicta that a dis-
tribution of earnings and profits pursuant to a reorganization had the effect.
of a distribution of a taxable dividend.'" Following this decision, the Com-
missioner took the much criticized position 41 that any property distribution
made in connection with a corporate reorganization would automatically be
taxable as dividend income to the extent of earnings and profits.'
32 I.R.C.	 354.
2 :3 See note 31 supra.
I.R.C. § 356(a).
35 I.R.C. § 356(a)(2).
31i Id .
n See Rev. Rul. 56-220, 1956-1 C.B. 191, in which the Commissioner took the
position that whenever there are sufficient accumulated earnings and profits, boot is to
be taxed as a dividend. The government. appeared to abandon the automatic dividend
rule in Rev. Rul. 74-515, 1974-2 C.B. 118, and Rev. Rul. 74-516, 1974-2 C.B. 121. The
Commissioner took the position that. "[a]lthough section 302 does not literally apply in
determining whether a distribution has the effect of a dividend under section
356(a)(2), in appropriate cases the tests contained in that section may serve as useful
guidelines for purposes of applying section 356(a)(2)." Id. Finally, in Rev. Rul. 75-83,
1975-I C.B. 112, the Commissioner reconfirmed his position that in determining
whether boot has the effect of a distribution of u dividend "it is appropriate to look to
principles developed under section 302 for determining dividend equivalency." Id.
38 325 U.S. 283 (1945). The Court stated "that a distribution pursuant to a
reorganization of earnings and profits 'has the effect of a distribution of a dividend'
within the meaning of [section 356(a)(2)1." See also B. BrrmER & j. EUSTICE, FEDERAL
INCOME TAXATION OF CORPORATIONS AND SHAREHOLDERS § 14.34 (2d ed. 1971) [here-
inafter cited as BrrrKER & EUST/CE].
3" 325 U.S. at 283.
4" Id. at 292.
4 ' See, e.g.. Levin, Adess and McGaffey, Boot Distributions in Corporate
Reorganizations—Determination of Dividend Equivalency, 30 TAX LAW. 287 (1977) [here-
inafter cited as Levin]; Shoulson, Boot Taxation.' The Blunt Toe of the Automatic Rule, 20
TAx L. REV. 573 (1965).
42 See note 37 supra.
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As the commentators correctly noted, the automatic dividend approach is
simply not reconcilable with the language of section 356(a)(2)." It is clear
that Congress used the phrase "has the effect of the distribution of a div-
idend" in section 356(a)(2) precisely to avoid the automatic dividend ap-
proach expressly adopted in section 356(b)44 and
 356(e). 45 Furthermore, it is
a long step from Bedford, which involved a recapitalization, to the application
of such a rule in acquisitive reorganizations. 4 "
In 1958, the Court of Claims in Idaho Power Co. v. United States 47 rejected
this automatic dividend approach. The case involved a public utility which
called its 6 and 7 percent preferred stock by offering shareholders a choice of
either 4 percent preferred stock and cash, or cash plus payment of the ac-
crued dividends on the outstanding preferred stock. 48
 The Idaho Power
Company, in order to obtain favorable tax treatment under the 1939 Code,"
claimed that the distribution of boot had the effect of a distribution of a div-
idend. The court disagreed, holding that due to the drastic reduction in the
interests of the shareholders, the transaction did not constitute a dividend for
the purposes of section 356(a)(2). 5 " In so doing, the court rejected the tax-
payer's argument that the presence of sufficient earnings and profits ipso facto
requires dividend taxation."
As a result of the Court of Claim's decision in Idaho Power, courts have
refused to adopt the automatic dividend approach to determining dividend
effect under section 356(a)(2), and have chosen to examine the facts and cir-
cumstances of each case." In making this inquiry, courts have considered
such factors as whether the distribution was made on a pro rata basis, and
whether there was a resulting reduction in the taxpayer's equity interest in the
continuing corporation. 53 Despite the rejection of the autothatic dividend
rule, cases decided after Idaho Power have done little to clarify the question
43
 J. Semi, JR., FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF CORPORATE REORGANIZATIONS
49 (Practicing Law Institute, 1972) [hereinafter cited as Scorn].
44
 I.R.C. § 356(b). This section is applicable when boot is received in connec-
tion with a divisive reorganization.
45
 I.R.C. § 356(e). This section is applicable when boot is received in exchange
for § 306 stock.
45 See BITTKER & EUSTICF., supra note 38. There is no acquiring corporation in
a recapitalization as the transaction is merely a readjustment in the financial structure
of a single corporation. Id. at § 14.59.
47 161 F. Supp. 807 (Ct. Cl.), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 832 (1958).
48 Id. at 808.
" See Int. Rev. Code of 1939, § 26(h) (now I.R.C. § 247). This section allows
public utility companies to deduct a portion of dividends paid on certain preferred
stock. This is an exception to the general rule that dividends paid by a corporation are
not deductible.
5" 161 F. Supp. at 810.
51 Id. at 809.
52 E.g., Wright v. United States, 482 F.2d 6(10 (8th Cir. 1973); Hawkinson v.
Commissioner, 235 F.2d 741 (2d Cir. 1956); Ross v. United States, 173 F. Stipp. 793
(Ct. Cl.), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 875 (1959).
" See cases cited in note 52 supra.
March 1979]	 CASENOTES	 607
whether a boot distribution has the effect of a dividend. In any given transac-
tion the issue remains whether dividend or capital gain characteristics pre-
dominate.
Section 356 is not the only Code section in which the issue of dividend
effect arises. In adopting section 356(a)(2) Congress virtually paraphrased sec-
tion 302(b)(1), which provides that if a corporation redeems its stock and the
"redemption is not essentially equivalent to a dividend," the transaction will be
entitled to capital gains treatment. Section 302 provides two standards under
which a redemption of stock may qualify for capital gains treatment. Section
302(b)(I), as noted, affords capital gains treatment to stock redemptions which
are not "essentially equivalent to a dividend." A taxpayer may also qualify for
preferred tax treatment if he can satisfy the disproportionate redemption and
termination of interest requirements of section 302(b)(2). These percentage
requirements—the so-called safe harbor provisions—are met if:
(1) the shareholder owns less than 50 percent of the total stock after
the redemption; and
(2) the ratio of voting stock owned after the redemption is less than
80 percent of the percentage of voting stock owned before the re-
demption; and
(3) the ratio of common stock (whether voting or non-voting) after
the redemption is less than 80 percent of the percentage owned be-
fore the redemption.
Despite the absence of an express statutory relationship between sections 302
and 356, courts have often applied the principles developed under section
302 in deciding cases under section 356(a)(2)."
Prior to 1970 and the Supreme Court's decision in United States v. Davis,"
the standards for determining dividend equivalence under section 302(b)(1)
were not well defined.`''' In Davis, the Supreme Court adopted a test. for
determining dividend equivalence under section 302(b)(1). 57 The Court was
faced with a redemption of preferred stock by a corporation which issued the
shares to obtain working capital in order to negotiate a loan." The Court
held that to avoid dividend equivalency the redemption must result. in a
meaningful reduction of the shareholder's proportionate interest in the cor-
poration." The taxpayer did not meet this test since he was the sole
shareholder of the corporation before and after the redemption." The
Court also noted that in making a determination whether a payment. in re-
demption of stock was "essentially equivalent to a dividend," business purpose
54 Id.
55 397 U.S. 301 (1970).
5" See Zinn & Silverman, Redemptions of Stock under Section 302(b)(1), 32 TAx
LAW. 91-92 (1979).
57 397 U.S. at 313.
5H
 Id. at. 303.
'" Id. at 313. The taxpayer owned all preferred and 25 percent. of the com-
mon stock. His wife and two children held the remaining stock. Id. at 302.
"" hi. at 313.
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and motive are irrelevant."' Thus, after Davis, to qualify for exchange treat-
ment under section 302(b)(1) a stock redemption "must result in a meaningful
reduction of the shareholder's proportionate interest in the corporation." 2
The first circuit court. to consider the applicability of the meaningful re-
duction test developed in Davis to a section 356 hoot distribution was the
United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit in Wright v. United
States." Wright involved the merger of two affiliated corporations, owned in
different proportions by the same shareholders, into a single entity."' Since a
pro rata distribution of stock would not result in the desired percentage own-
ership, the consolidation could not be accomplished without a boot distribu-
tion."' Accordingly, the newly formed corporation, eventually named Omni,
issued the taxpayer a promissory note." Prior to the merger, the first corpo-
ration had an earned surplus of approximately $102,000, while the second
corporation had art earned surplus of $38,000." 7
 The Commissioner argued
that the distribution of boot, to reflect the shareholder's greater entitlement,
was taxable as a dividend.
The Eighth Circuit disagreed with the Commissioner, holding that the
note did not have the effect of a distribution of a dividend under section
356(a)(2) and therefore was taxable at capital gain rates." In determining
that the boot distribution did not have the effect of a dividend, the Wright
court applied the meaningful reduction analysis developed under section 302
in Davis." Although there was no formal redemption, the court restructured
the transaction as if there had been a redemption of the acquiring corpora-
tion's stock.'" The court stated that the note "was issued by Omni (the ac-
quiring corporation] in exchange for a portion of Omni stock that the tax-
payer would have received if he had taken Omni stock entirely instead of
receiving Omni stock and a note issued to him by Omni."" The court re-
jected the Government's argument that the boot should be considered as hav-
ing been distributed prior to the reorganization. 72
 Instead, the court held
that the dividend equivalence rules provided in section 302 make sense only
in relation to the acquiring corporation which remains in business after the
reorganization is complete."
"i Id. at 302. Both Davis and its progeny make it clear that business purpose is
irrelevant in determining dividend equivalence under § 302. In short. the Commis-
sioner should not scrutinize the transaction for its underlying rationale.
12 Id. at. 313.
"3
 482 F.2d 600 (8th Cir. 1973).














In applying section 302 to the boot distribution before it, the Wright court
first examined the safe harbor provisions of section 302(b)(2)." The court
determined that the hypothetical redemption did not meet the prescribed sec-
tion 302(14(2) mathematical qualifications. 75 Nevertheless, the court did find
that the "redemption" resulted in a 23.3 percent reduction in the taxpayer's
ownership in the surviving corporation. 7 G On the basis of this reduction, the
court concluded that the meaningful reduction test enunciated by the Su-
preme Court in Davis had been satisfied." Since the hypothetical redemption
did not have dividend equivalence under section 302(b)(1), the court held that
the boot distribution did not have the effect of a distribution of a dividend
under section 356(a)(2). 78
The Service responded to the decision in Wright by issuing Revenue Rul-
ing 75-83. 7" In this Ruling, the Service held that the application of section
302 principles to section 356(a)(2) requires a distribution of boot. to be treated
as a hypothetical redemption by the acquired corporation, not the acquiring
corporation as the court held in Wright. The Revenue Ruling illustrated the
Service's position with an example in which A owned 100 percent of the sixty
outstanding shares of X corporation. X corporation then merged into Y cor-
poration. Prior to the merger, Y corporation had forty shares of stock out-
standing at a $10 fair market value, of which B, C, D, and E each owned 25
percent. In return for all sixty shares of X corporation stock, A received
thirty-five shares of Y corporation stock and a $250 note. The Service took
the position that in determining whether the boot distributed to A in ex-
change for his shares of X corporation stock had the effect of a distribution
of a dividend, section 302 redemption principles should be applied as if X
corporation, and not Y corporation, had redeemed a portion of its stock
prior to the reorganization." Viewing the distribution as a redemption by X
corporation, it could not possibly result in a reduction of A's interest in X
corporation since A was the sole shareholder of the acquired corporation.
Thus, under the Service's approach, the distribution of boot to A would be
taxable as ordinary income.'
An application of the Wright approach to the facts of Revenue Ruling
75-83 would, however, result in an entirely different conclusion. If A had
received only Y corporation stock as consideration for a merger, A would
have owned 60 percent of the 100 outstanding shares of Y corporation stock
after the merger. Under the Wright court's view, the transaction would be
7"
	
at 608. Section 302(b)(2) establishes certain mathematical calculations
which determine whether a distribution results in a "substantially disproportionate re-
demption of stock." See text at notes 53-54 supra.
75 Id. at 608.
7 " Id. at 607.
77 Id. at 609.
78 Id. at 610.
7 " Rev. Rul. 75-83, 1975-1 C.B. 112.
'" Id. at 113.
'I' Under I.R.C. § 316, corporate distributions are taxed as dividend income to
the extent of the shareholder's pro rata share of earnings and profits.
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restructured as if A had received sixty shares of Y corporation followed by a
twenty-five share post-merger redemption. As a result of this hypothetical re-
demption, A's ownership percentage dropped from 60 percent to 48 percent,
which would satisfy both the Davis meaningful reduction standard under sec-
tion 302(b)(I) and the mathematical requirements of section 302(h)(2). 82 The
Commissioner's refusal to follow the Wright decision leads ineluctably to the
conclusion that any pro rata distribution of boot as part of a reorganization
has the effect of a dividend distribution, since the Service has declined to
examine changes in the shareholder's ownership of the acquiring corporation
which may occur as a result of the merger. 83
While it is clear that courts have abandoned the automatic dividend rule
in favor of examining the facts and circumstances of each case, the proper
application of section 302 standards to a section 356 boot distribution remains
a source of considerable confusion. The differing approaches adopted by the
Eight. Circuit in Wright and the Service in Revenue Ruling 75-83 reflect two
opposing views of the use of section 302 "dividend equivalence" principles in
deciding cases under section 356(a)(2). The Fifth Circuit. in Shimberg rejected
the Eighth Circuit's approach and adopted the view adhered to by the Service.
In so doing, the Fifth Circuit has done little to eliminate the controversy
which exists in this area of the tax law.
II. THE SHIMBERG DECISION
The following discussion will first present a comparison of the Wright and
Shimberg approaches to determining whether a distribution has the effect of a
distribution of a dividend under section 356(a)(2). The section will then
examine why the Shimberg approach is unjustified. Finally, the section will
propose a legislative revision of section 356.
A. Comparison of Wright and Shimberg
The district court in Shimberg refused to follow the Service's position in
Revenue Ruling 75-83. Instead, the court based its conclusion that the hoot
distribution did not have the effect of a dividend on a comparison of the
taxpayer's 66 percent pre-merger interest in LSC with his less than I percent
post-merger interest in a large publicly held corporation." The Fifth Circuit
held that. the district, court had erred in utilizing a meaningful reduction stan-
dard, reasoning that such a standard would render section 356(a)(2) virtually
meaningless." 5
 The court maintained that a comparison of a shareholder's
interest in the acquired corporation with his interest in the acquiring corpora-
tion would always reveal a marked shift in ownership percentage when a small
company merges with a larger one. In this way, the Shimberg court rejected
the Wright court's approach and effectively adopted the approach taken by the
Service in Revenue Ruling 75-83. 8 "
" See text at notes 53-54 supra.
" 3 See Levin, supra note 41, at 288-89.
" 415 F. Stipp. at 836.
83 M. at 288.
'' See text at notes 79-83.
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The following illustration serves to demonstrate the difference between
the Fifth Circuit's approach in Shimberg and the Eighth Circuit's approach in
Wright. Prior to X corporation's merger with Y corporation, A owned all 100
shares of X corporation and B owned all 1,000 shares of Y corporation. As
consideration for the transfer of his 100 shares in X corporation, A received
sixty shares of Y stock and a $40 boot. An examination of the transaction
under the Wright court's approach would restructure the transaction to show
receipt of 100 shares of Y corporation stock by A, followed by a forty share
post-merger redemption by the acquiring corporation. The calculations which
demonstrate the satisfaction of section 302 principles are as follows:
Post-merger ownership of Y	 100 shares (held by A)
	  — 9.1%corporation:	 1100 shares (outstanding)
Post-merger ownership of
Y corporation after the
redem ption:
A) Section 302(b)(1):





.057	 or a 37.4% reduction in A's ownership percentage
.626
	
.091	 from what he would have owned if he had not received
the $40 hoot.
The 37.4 percent reduction certainly constitutes a meaningful reduction
under Davis, and therefore section 302(b)(1) is satisfied and the distribution is
entitled to capital gains treatment.
B) Section 302(b)(2):
80% of .91 = .073
Since .057 is less than .073, and since .057 is also much less than 50% of Y'S
total voting power, the mathematical requirements of section 302(b)(2) are
also satisfied, and again the distribution is entitled to capital gains treatment.
In contrast, an examination of the above merger under the approach of
the Shimberg court would restructure the transaction to show a pro rata dis-
tribution of boot by the acquired corporation as if no reorganization had taken
place. In effect, corporation X distributed $40 to its sole owner. If corpora-
tion X had sufficient earnings and profits at the time of the distribution, it
would be characterized as a dividend and would be taxed as ordinary income.
As the above illustration demonstrates, the tax treatment of a boot dis-
tribution is dependent upon whether the determination of dividend effect is
made with reference to the acquired or the acquiring corporation. As the Shim-
berg court recognized, the issue is obviously a complex one. Despite the court's
statement to the contrary, however, the Shimberg decision signals a limited re-
turn to the automatic dividend rule. 87 In effect, this approach would deny
capital gains treatment whenever the distribution of boot is made in propor-
tion to the shareholder's stock ownership in the acquired corporation, and the
acquired corporation has sufficient earnings and profits.
87 577 F.2cl at 290.
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B. An Evaluation of the Shimberg Approach
It is submitted that the Fifth Circuit in Shimberg failed to justify its refusal
to apply section 302 principles in determining the dividend effect of a boot
distribution under section 356(a)(2). Furthermore, the approach taken by the
Wright court represents the proper application of section 302 principles in the
context of a reorganization. The failure of the Shimberg court's reasoning is
five-fold. First, the court's interpretation assumes that Congress intended to
"automatically" deny capital gains treatment whenever the distribution is pro
rata. In the words of one commentator, "[i]f the Congress had intended such
an automatic result ... the language of section 356(a)(2) could and would
have so stated." 88 Congress' use of the phrase "has the effect of the distribu-
tion of a dividend," 89 implies that a more flexible analysis should be used and
that each case should be considered on its own facts and circumstances." This
alternative interpretation is also supported by the fact that Congress adopted
an explicit automatic rule in section 356(b) 91 and section 356(e), 92 and could
have so provided when section 356(a)(2) was incorporated into the Internal
Revenue Code of 1954.
Second, the Fifth Circuit. fails to cite any authority for the proposition
that section 302 standards should not be applicable to a section 356(a)(2) boot
distribution. 93 The court's failure to find any support for this proposition is
not surprising since courts have uniformly construed section 356 in pari
materia with section 302 in determining the effect of a boot distribution." The
Shimberg court found the Wright decision distinguishable, noting that the facts
of that case provided no opportunity for reshaping the transaction as a
redemption since the corporations were owned and controlled by the same
shareholders." As was previously demonstrated, this argument is without
merit." If the transaction is viewed as a hypothetical post-merger redemp-
tion of shares in order to obtain the desired boot, it is entirely possible to
ascertain whether the receipt of cash by Mr. Shimberg satisfied the dividend
equivalence standards of section 302. In short, any dissimilarity between the
facts of Wright and Shimberg simply does not support the Fifth Circuit's refusal
to apply section 302 standards.
88 See Sco.r.r, supra note 43, at 49.
" I.R.C. § 356(a)(2) (emphasis added).
99 577 F.2d at 288.
91 I.R.C. § 356(b).
92 I.R.C. § 356(e).
93 577 F.2d at 288.
94 See, e.g., Hawkinson v. Commissioner, 235 F.2d 747 (2d Cir. 1956); Ross v.
United States, 173 F. Supp. 793 (Ct. CI.), cert. denied, 361 U:S. 875 (1959). See also
Kirschenbaum v. Commissioner, 155 F.2d 23, 24 (2d Cir. 1946), in which Judge
Learned Hand noted that "[w]hether the distribution of accumulated earnings has the
effect of the distribution of a taxable dividend' is surely the same question as whether
such a distribution is 'essentially equivalent to a dividend.'"
95 577 F.2d at 287.
99 See text at notes 86-87 supra.
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Third, the Shimberg court's reasoning fails to correspond with the legisla-
tive history of section 356. 97 The Committee Reports provide little support
for the Shimberg court's holding that. section 356(a)(2) requires a determination
whether the distribution would have been taxed as a dividend in a transaction
prior to the reorganization. 98 Section 356 was designed to prevent evasions
in situations substantially similar to an example contained in the Committee
Reports."" In this example, corporation A merged with corporation R, which
was organized by the original shareholders for the purpose of bailing out
earnings at capital gain rates. The stockholders in corporation A had the
same interest before and after the merger. In contrast, if the transaction in
Shimberg is restructured as a receipt of stock followed by a post-merger re-
demption by the acquiring corporation, it can be shown that the taxpayer-
substantially reduced his equity interest in NIGIC.'" In short, the distribu-
tion of boot in Shimberg was not the type of transaction Congress was attempt-
ing to prevent. Section 356 was intended to prevent a corporation from bail-
" 7 See H.R. REP. No. 179, 68th Cong., 1st Sess. 14-15 (1924), reprinted in
1939-1 C.B. (Part 2), 241-42; S. REP, No, 398, 68th Cong., 1st. Sess. 15-16 (1924),
reprinted in 1939-1 C.B. (Part 2), 266-67 jhereinaber cited as Committee Reponsl.
"" Id. In Commissioner v. Estate of Bedford, 325 U.S. 283 (1945), the Su-
preme Court gave the following analysis of the Committee Reports: "The history of
the legislation is not illuminating. ... The reports of the Congressional Committee
merely use the language of the section to explain We are thrown back upon the
legislative language for ascertaining the meaning which will best accord with the aims
of the language, the practical administration of the law and relevant judicial construc-
tion. - /r/. at 290.
v" See Committee Reports, supra note 97.
''' The following analysis is condensed from calculations contained in the
plaintiff's brief at pages 23-25;
The number of additional shares is obtained by dividing the amount of
cash received by the taxpayer, $4 I 7,449, by the market value of a share of
MGIC stock on the date of closing, or $58.35. The merger agreement
called for a total exchange of MG1C voting common stock valued at
$3,750,000 and cash amounting to $625,000 for all the outstanding shares
of LSC. At the time of the merger, taxpayer received, in exchange for his
LSC stock, 21,461 shares of MGIC stock and $417,449 in cash. Taxpayer
had no interest at the time of the merger in an additional 21,461 shares
placed in escrow, such interest being entirely a future interest dependent
on the post-merger earnings of the LSC business. Assuming that taxpayer's
cash consideration had been received in stock, he would have obtained an
additional 7,154 shares of MGIC stock ($417,499÷$58.35) for a total of
28,615 (21,461 plus 7,154) shares. Prior to the merger, 6,204,448 shares of
MGIC stock were issued and outstanding. An additional 32,132 shares
were issued to the LSC stockholders at the time of the merger, for a total
of 6,236;580 shares issued and outstanding. Had the $625,000 cash consid-
eration been exchanged as stock in the merger, 10,711 more shares would
have been issued to the LSC stockholders ($625,000±$58.35) for a total of
6,247,291 MGIC shares issued and outstanding. Assuming an "all stock"
merger and a post-closing redemption of that number of the taxpayer's
shares equivalent to the cash he already received, all as contemplated by
Wright, the taxpayer suffered a substantially disproportionate redemption
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ing out retained earnings when there is no meaningful reduction in the
shareholders' equity interest in the corporation.
Fourth, the court's reasoning is internally inconsistent. In reaching its de-
cision, the Shimberg court reasoned that the distribution was merely a method
by which a continuing business enterprise could obtain favorable tax treat-
ment for a pro rata transfer of earnings and profits.'" The court attempted
to justify its conclusion through the use of the following syllogism:
If a pro rata distribution of profits from a continuing corporation is
a dividend and a corporate reorganization is a "continuance of the
proprietary interests in the continuing enterprise under modified
corporate form," it follows that a pro rata distribution of "hoot" to
shareholders of one of the participating corporations must certainly
have "the effect of the distribution of a dividend" within the mean-
ing of § 356(a)(2). 1 "
The court's analysis is circular, since its conclusion appears as its major prem-
ise; the court assumes that the boot was a "pro rata distribution of profits,"
which is exactly what it set out to prove. Since the conclusion results by defini-
within the meaning of' Section 302(14(2). The calculations demonstrating
this are as follows:
(a) Taxpayer's % Ownership After the Merger:
MGIC shares owned by the taxpayer
28,615	 (21,461) + (7,154) equivalent to cash
6,247,291	 issued and outstanding MGIC
stock (6,236,580) plus 10,711
shares equivalent to cash
= {).458%
(b) Taxpayer's % Ownership After the Merger and After a Re-
demption on His Stock Equivalent to Cash Received in the
Merger:
MGIC shares owned by taxpayer
(28,615) less 7,154 shares
21,461	 equivalent to cash
6,236,580	 issued and outstanding MGIC
stock (6,247,291) less 10,711
shares equivalent to cash
= 0.3441%
(c) 80% of Taxpayer's Ownership Position Prior to the Redemp-
tion:
(0.80 x 0.00458) = 0.366%
(d) Taxpayer's Subsequent Ownership Position:
0.3441% is less than 0.366% (80% of his prior ownership posi-
tion), and, furthermore, is less than 50% of MG1C's total vot-
ing power.
111 577 F.2d at 288.
'DI Id.
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tion, the court's reasoning provides little support for its position that any pro
rata distribution incident to a reorganization should invariably be treated as a
dividend to the extent of earnings and profits.
Finally, the Shimberg court's determination that the tax treatment of a div-
idend should be measured by examining the earnings and profits of the ac-
quired corporation is inconsistent with the Government's litigating position in
Wright and the plain language of section 356(a)(2). 1 " In Wright. the court
stated:
We agree with the Commissioner that "it is not material whether the
distribution is actually made by the corporation entering the reor-
ganization or by the corporation resulting from the reorganization."
Courts and the Commissioner have said that it is irrelevant whether
the earnings and profits were distributed before or after consolida-
tion.' "4
The court in Wright held that the boot distribution was not a dividend and did
not examine the earnings and profits of either corporation.'" In Revenue
Ruling 75-83 the Service itself recognized that the express statutory language
of section 356(a)(2) requires that "the amount of the dividend is measured by
reference to the earnings and profits of the transferor."'" Accordingly, the
determination whether a distribution of boot has the effect of a dividend
should he made prior to any examination of earnings and profits.
As a consequence of the above five considerations, it is suggested that a
court faced with a situation similar to the one in Shimberg should restructure
the transaction as a hypothetical receipt of stock followed by a post-merger
redemption by the acquired corporation. In making this inquiry, the criteria
developed for use under section 302 should be applied. The court should
treat the issue as an ultimate question of fact to he resolved through an
examination of the entire transaction. 1 °" Despite the Shimberg court's holding
to the contrary, the court should examine not only the pro rata nature of the
distribution, but also examine changes in the taxpayer's control of the post-
merger corporation.
C. Proposed Congressional Revision of Section 356
The determination of dividend effect. under section 356(a)(2) remains, as
before Shirnherg, a source of considerable confusion in the tax law. As a result,
a congressional clarification on the proper tax treatment of hoot received in
the context of a reorganization would serve to reduce the problems which
arise in this area. A suggested possible revision of section 356 is as follows:
1"3 Id. at 289.
1 " 482 F.2d at 6117 (emphasis added).
1115 Id .
"" 1975-1 CAI. 112.
" 7 See Treas. Reg. § 1.302-2(b). See also Wright, 482 F.2d at 605, and Shimberg,
415 F. Supp. at 836 (district court opinion).
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Eliminate the phrase "has the effect. of the distribution of a div-
idend" from paragraph (2) and substitute the "meaningful reduc-
tion" standard enunciated in Davis.
Add the following paragraph:
(3) DEFINITION—For purposes of paragraph (2) a distribu-
tion of money or property shall be treated as having been made by
the acquiring corporation.
Application of the Davis meaningful reduction analysis would provide the
courts with a clear guideline for applying the principles of section 302 in a
predictable and consistent manner. Furthermore, the proposed definitional
subsection would allow the Congress to clearly indicate that the approach
adopted by the Eighth Circuit in Wright is more consistent with the fulfillment
of the purpose behind section 356(a)(2).
CONCLUSION
In Shimberg, the Fifth Circuit held that a pro rata distribution of cash pur-
suant to a corporate reorganization will be restructured as a dividend distribu-
tion made by the acquired corporation prior to merger. In so doing, the Fifth
Circuit ignored the express language of the statute, its legislative history, and
the clear weight of authority. It is submitted that the Shimberg court should
have applied the alternative analysis utilized by the Eighth Circuit in Wright v.
United States. If it had done so, the distribution of boot to the taxpayer would
not have been taxable as a dividend, but as a capital gain.
TRENHOLME J. GRIFFIN
